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Abstract
Despite the fact many scholars have shown an interest in China’s allocation efficiency,
few studies have examined quantitative analysis of allocation efficiency within and between
the state-owned and private sectors. To address this issue, this paper develops a quantita-
tive measure of allocation efficiency, which is an extension of the dynamic Olley-Pakes
productivity decomposition proposed by Melitz and Polanec (2015). The extended mea-
sure enables the simultaneous capture of the degree of misallocation within a group and
between groups and parallel to capturing the contribution of entering and exiting firms to
aggregate productivity growth. Using China’s manufacturing firm-level data from 2003 to
2007, the author examine the efficiency of resource allocation within and between three
ownership sectors (state-owned, domestic private, and foreign sectors). It is found that the
between allocation efficiency tends to improve in industries wherein market shares move
from the less-productive state sector to the more-productive private sector.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies argued that the allocation of production resources among firms or sectors is a
key driver behind the growth of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) (Restuccia and Roger-
son, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bartelsman et al., 2013; Collard-Wexler and De Loecker,
2015). The shift in production resources from less productive to more productive units yields
an increase in aggregate TFP, and resource allocation efficiency can be crucial to explaining
countries’ aggregate TFP. A well-functioning market economy has a function to allocate more
production resources to more productive businesses. Because developing economies are gen-
erally found to have lower allocation efficiency than developed economies, improving resource
allocation is expected to increase their aggregate TFP and GDP per capita.
In this paper, the author investigates the allocation of production resources in China’s man-
ufacturing sector. Several scholars have argued the degree of allocation efficiency in China. For
example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) used manufacturing firm-level data from 1998 to 2005 to
measure the degree of misallocation and found that misallocation within an industry tended to
decline over time. Chen, et al. (2011) used industry-level data from 1980 to 2008 and found
that factor reallocation played a substantial role in increasing aggregate productivity from 1980
to 2000; however, after 2001, they found that allocation efficiency worsened and contributed to
decreasing productivity growth. Brandt, et al. (2013) also used industry-level data by province
from 1985 to 2007 and found that misallocation within provinces declined between 1985 and
1997 but increased in the last 10 years.
Although many researchers have maintained continuous interests in the allocation efficiency
in China, little study has been done to actually explore resource allocation between ownership
sectors. Since the 2000s, one debate has been over the state sector’s advantageous access to
capital resources compared with the private sector, a phenomenon called Guojin Mintui (i.e.,
the state advances, the private sector retreats). Such a favorable environment for the state sector
may impede the growth of the private sector, causing resource allocation to deteriorate. Has
China’s resource allocation between the state and private sector been working efficiently? There
are no definitive answers to this questions.
To address this issue, the author develops a quantitative measure of allocation efficiency,
which is an extension of the dynamic Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition proposed by
Melitz and Polanec (2015).1) The covariance measure was originally proposed by Olley and
Pakes (1996), Melitz and Polanec (2015) extended it to capture the contributions of entering and
exiting firms, calling it the dynamic Olley-Pakes (OP) productivity decomposition. However,
the dynamic and non-dynamic (i.e., original) OP decomposition do not capture allocation effi-
ciency between groups (e.g., ownership groups); they only capture allocation efficiency within
a group. This paper attempts to extend the dynamic OP decomposition to a multi-group version
to simultaneously capture the degree of allocation efficiency within a group and between groups
and parallel to capturing the contribution of entering and exiting firms. Using this extended de-
composition, the author examines the allocation efficiency within and between the state-owned,
1)There are two types of empirical measures of allocation efficiency: (1) the gap beween marginal product and
the unit cost of input (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Petrin and Levinsohn, 2012) and (2) the covariance between a
firm’s market share and productivity (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Collard-Wexler and De Loecker, 2013; Melitz and
Polanec, 2015). This paper attempts to extend the latter measure of allocation efficiency.
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domestic private, and foreign sectors.
The data used for the quantitative analysis is based on China’s manufacturing firm-level
data from 2003 to 2007. The empirical analysis has two steps. First, firm-level productivity is
estimated using a structural estimation method proposed by Gandhi, et al. (2016). Second, the
productivity decomposition method is exploited to quantify the effect of misallocation on aggre-
gate manufacturing productivity. As a result, allocation efficiency between the three ownership
sectors (state-owned, domestic private, and foreign sectors) tends to improve in industries in
which the market share moves from a less-productive state-owned sector to a more productive
private sector. However, this efficiency tends to worsen in industries in which 1) the state-owned
sector’s TFP increases on relative basis despite decreases in its market share or 2) the private
sector’s TFP does not grow compared with other sectors despite increases in its market share.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the measure of
allocation efficiency used in this study. Section 3 describes the TFP estimation procedure and
the data sources, Section 4 reports the allocation efficiency in China, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Measure of Allocation Efficiency
The measure of allocation efficiency used in this paper is based on a productivity decomposi-
tion method originally developed by Olley and Pakes (OP; 1996) and extended by Melitz and
Polanec (MP; 2015) to a dynamic version. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 review the OP and MP methods,
and Section 2.3 describes the extended version of their methods. Section 4 reports the empirical
results of allocation efficiency between ownership groups.
2.1 Olley-Pakes Decomposition
Let us consider aggregate productivity (Φt), which is defined as the weighted average of firm-
level productivity: Φt =
∑
i∈Ωt sitφit, where Ωt is the set of firms at time t, φit is the firm-level log
TFP, and sit is firm i’s share of output at time t. Olley and Pakes (1996) showed that aggregate
productivity can be decomposed into the following two parts:
Φt =
∑
i∈Ωt
sitφit =
1
Nt
∑
i∈Ωt
φit +
∑
i∈Ωt
sit − 1Nt
∑
ι∈Ωt
sιt

φit − 1Nt
∑
ι∈Ωt
φιt

= µt + covt
(1)
where µt represents the unweighted mean productivity and covt is proportional to the covari-
ance between market shares and productivity. covt represents the magnitude of allocation effi-
ciency because it increases as more-productive firms have higher market shares, and conversely,
it decreases as less productive firms have higher market shares. Olley and Pakes (1996) used
plant-level panel data on the U.S. telecommunications equipment industry from 1974 to 1987 to
estimate plant-level productivity for the industry and then exploited it to calculate OP decom-
position. They found that the unweighted mean productivity (µt) did not change much since
1975, but the covariance term increased from 0.01 in 1974 to 0.32 in 1987. They concluded that
a factor reallocation occurred from less-productive to more-productive plants.
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2.2 Dynamic Olley-Pakes Decomposition
Melitz and Polanec (2015) extended the OP decomposition to capture the contribution of en-
tering and exiting firms in aggregate productivity, which is called the dynamic Olley-Pakes
productivity decomposition. They showed that the difference in the aggregate log TFP at times
1 and 2 (∆Φ = Φ2 − Φ1) can be decomposed into the following parts: (1) unweighted TFP
of firms surviving during the period, (2) the OP’s covariance term calculated using surviving
firms’ log TFP and market shares, and (3) the contribution of entering and exiting firms during
the period.
The dynamic Olley-Pakes (DOP) decomposition is derived as follows. First, the aggregate
log TFP at time 1 (Φ1) is decomposed into surviving firms’ log TFP and exiting firms’ log TFP
at time 1:
Φ1 =
∑
i∈ΩS
si1φi1 +
∑
i∈ΩX
si1φi1
= ΦS1 + s
X
1
(
ΦX1 − ΦS1
)
,
(2)
where ΩS and ΩX denote the sets of surviving and exiting firms during the period and ΦS1 and
ΦX1 are the aggregate log TFPs at time 1 for surviving and exiting firms, respectively:
ΦS1 =
∑
i∈ΩS
si1∑
ι∈ΩS sι1
φi1, Φ
X
1 =
∑
i∈ΩX
si1∑
ι∈ΩX sι1
φi1, sX1 =
∑
i∈ΩX
si1.
Similarly, the aggregate log TFP at time 2 is decomposed into surviving firms’ log TFP at time
2 and entering firms’ log TFP at time 2:
Φ2 =
∑
i∈ΩS
si2φi2 +
∑
i∈ΩE
si2φi2
= ΦS2 + s
E
2
(
ΦE2 − ΦS2
)
,
(3)
where ΩE denotes the set of entering firms during the period and ΦS2 and Φ
E
2 are the aggregate
log TFPs at time 2 for surviving firms and entering firms, respectively:
ΦS2 =
∑
i∈ΩS
si2∑
ι∈ΩS sι2
φi2, Φ
E
2 =
∑
i∈ΩE
si2∑
ι∈ΩE sι2
φi2, sE2 =
∑
i∈ΩE
si2.
Applying the OP decomposition to ΦSt (t = 1, 2) yields:
ΦSt =
1
NS
∑
i∈ΩS
φit +
∑
i∈ΩS
 sit∑
ι∈ΩS sιt
− 1
NS
∑
i∈ΩS
sit∑
ι∈ΩS sιt

φit − 1NS
∑
i∈ΩS
φit

= µSt + cov
S
t ,
(4)
where NS is the number of firms surviving during the period, µSt is the unweighted mean pro-
ductivity of surviving firms, and covSt represents the magnitude of allocation efficiency among
4
surviving firms. Substituting Equation (4) in Equations (2) and (3) and taking the difference of
the aggregate log TFP (∆Φ = Φ2 − Φ1) results in the DOP decomposition as follows:
∆Φ = ∆µS + ∆covS + sE2 (Φ
E
2 − ΦS2 ) + sX1 (ΦS1 − ΦX1 )
= ∆µS + ∆covS + ent + ext ,
(5)
where ∆µS = µS2 − µS1 , ∆covS = covS2 − covS1 , ent = sE2 (ΦE2 − ΦS2 ), and ext = sX1 (ΦS1 − ΦX1 ).
The first term on right-hand side is the change in the unweighted average log TFP for surviving
firms. The second term is the change in the covariance, which indicates the change in the
magnitude of allocation efficiency among surviving firms. The contributions of entering and
exiting firms appear in ent and ext, respectively, both of which are evaluated in comparison
with the productivity of surviving firms as follows:
ent ⋚ 0 when ΦE2 ⋚ Φ
S
2 ,
ext ⋚ 0 when ΦS1 ⋚ Φ
X
1 .
Thus, the DOP decomposition method allows us to identify the contributions of entering and
exiting firms.
Melitz and Polanec (2015) used firm-level panel data from the Slovenian manufacturing
sector from 1995 to 2000 to estimate the parameters of a production function for the industry
and then calculated the DOP decomposition using the estimated log TFP and the log of labor
productivity. They found that the aggregate log TFP change (∆Φ) from 1995 to 2000 is 0.4013
and is decomposed into the unweighted mean productivity for surviving firms (∆µS = 0.2758),
the covariance term change (∆covS = 0.0955), and the contributions of entering and exiting
firms (ent = 0.0021, ext = 0.0279). Their results indicate that the improvement in allocation
efficiency added 10 percentage points to aggregate TFP growth during the five years.
2.3 Augmented Dynamic OP (ADOP) Decomposition
The OP and DOP decompositions allow us to quantify the degree of allocation efficiency within
a group (e.g., an industrial sector). However, these quantifications can be augmented to a multi-
group version to simultaneously capture the degree of allocation efficiency within a group and
between groups. This section shows the augmented version of the DOP decomposition.
Let us consider that the number of groups is J and aggregate log TFP at time 1 is represented
as:
Φ1 =
∑J
j=1
w j1
∑
i∈Ω j1
si1
w j1
φi1
=
∑J
j=1
w j1 µ˜ j1,
where Ω j1 is the set of firms in group j at time 1, w j1 is group j’s output share at time 1,
and µ˜ j1 =
∑
i∈Ω j1(si1/w j1)φit is the weighted average log TFP for group j. Applying the OP
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decomposition to the above equation yields:
Φ1 =
1
J
∑J
j=1
µ˜ j1 +
∑J
j=1
(
w jt − 1J
∑J
κ=1
wκ1
) (
µ˜ j1 − 1J
∑J
κ=1
µ˜κ1
)
=
1
J
∑J
j=1
µ˜ j1 + ˜cov1 ,
(6)
where ˜covt represents the magnitude of inter-group allocation efficiency. This paper defines
the first and second terms as “within-effect” and “between-effect,” respectively. The weight
ai j1 = si1/w j1 can be written as∑
i∈Ω j1
ai j1 =
∑
i∈ΩSj
ai j1 +
∑
i∈ΩXj
ai j1
= aSj1 + a
X
j1 = 1.
where ΩSj and Ω
X
j denote the sets of surviving and exiting firms for group j, respectively. They
can be decomposed into the weighted average log TFP of surviving firms and the contribution
of exiting firms:
µ˜ j1 =
∑
i∈ΩSj
ai j1
aSj1
φi1 + aXj1
∑
i∈ΩXj
ai j1
aXj1
φi1 −
∑
i∈ΩSj
ai j1
aSj1
φi1

= ΦSj1 + a
X
j1
(
ΦXj1 − ΦSj1
)
= ΦSj1 − ext j,
(7)
whereΦSj1 andΦ
X
j1 denote the weighted average log TFP of surviving and exiting firms for group
j, respectively, and ext j = aXj1
(
ΦSj1 − ΦXj1
)
represents the contribution of exiting firms to group
j’s aggregate productivity µ˜ j1. By exploiting the OP decomposition method, the first term of
Equation (7) can be decomposed as:
ΦSj1 =
1
NSj1
∑
i∈ΩSj
φi1 +
∑
i∈ΩSj
ai j1aSj1 − 1NSj1
∑
ι∈ΩSj
aι j1
aSj1

φi1 − 1NSj1
∑
ι∈ΩSj
φι1

= µSj1 + cov
S
j1,
(8)
where µSj1 is the simple average log TFP of surviving firms at time 1 and cov
S
j1 is the degree of
allocation efficiency within group j at time 1. Substituting Equations (8) and (7) in Equation
(6) yields the following decomposition:
Φ1 =
1
J
∑J
j=1
(
µSj1 + cov
S
j1 − ext j
)
︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
Within effect
+ ˜cov1︸︷︷︸
Between effect
. (9)
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Similarly, the aggregate log TFP at time 2 can be decomposed as follows:
Φ2 =
1
J
∑J
j=1
µ˜ j2 + ˜cov2
=
1
J
∑J
j=1
(
ΦSj2 + a
E
j2
(
ΦEj2 − ΦSj2
))
+ ˜cov2
=
1
J
∑J
j=1
(
µSj2 + cov
S
j2 + ent j
)
︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
Within effect
+ ˜cov2︸︷︷︸
Between effect
,
(10)
where ent j = aEj2
(
ΦEj2 − ΦSj2
)
indicates the contribution of entering firms to aggregate produc-
tivity µ˜ j2.
Finally, taking the difference between Φ1 and Φ2, the augmented dynamic OP (ADOP)
decomposition is obtained:
∆Φ =
1
J
∑J
j=1
(
∆µSj + ∆cov
S
j + ent j + ext j
)
︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
Within effect
+ ∆ ˜cov︸︷︷︸
Between effect
(11)
where ∆covSj represents the changes in allocation efficiency among surviving firms within group
j and ∆ ˜cov represents the changes in allocation efficiency between groups. When J = 1, Equa-
tion (10) reduces to the original dynamic OP decomposition.
In this paper, Equation (11) is used to decompose China’s aggregate productivity and in-
vestigate the magnitude of allocation efficiency within and between ownership sectors. The
empirical results are described in Section 4. Before reporting the results, the next section ex-
plains how to measure firm-level productivity (φit).
3 Production Function Estimation and Data Description
3.1 Production Function Estimation
Having clarified the measure of allocation efficiency in the previous section, showing the mea-
sure of firm-level productivity is required. This paper employs the nonparametric identification
strategy proposed by Gandhi, et al. (GNR; 2016) to measure China’s firm-level productivity.
This method is built on the recent literature on production function estimation, such as Olley
and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (LP; 2003), and Ackerberg, et al. (ACF; 2006). The
Appendix A contains GNR’s estimation methodology used in this study.
3.2 Data Description
The data used to estimate the production function are based on unbalanced firm-level panel
data on China’s manufacturing industry from 2003 to 2007, which are obtained from the annual
survey of industrial enterprises conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. The survey
covers firms with sales higher than 5 million RMB in the mining, manufacturing, and public
utilities industries, and the original database consists of 336,768 industry firms for 2007, which
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is the same number as that reported in the China Statistical Yearbook published in 2008 (p.
485). Firm IDs contained in the database are used to construct a panel of observations.2)
The production function variables are constructed as follows: Yit is the total gross output, Kit
is the total fixed assets, Lit is the number of employees, and Mit is the total intermediate inputs.
The deflators for Yit and Mit are based on the output and input deflators provided by Brandt, et
al. (2012).3) The deflator for total fixed assets is constructed as follows.
(1) Firm-level total fixed-asset data at current prices are gathered by province. The province-
level data are denoted by K˜pt, where p denotes a province.
(2) The provincial nominal investment is calculated as I˜it = K˜pt − (1 − δ)K˜p,t−1. Following
Brandt et al. (2012), the depreciation rate δ is set at 0.09.
(3) I˜it is deflated by a province-level investment deflator, which is obtained from the China
Statistical Yearbook. Using the deflated investment (Ipt), provincial deflated fixed assets
are calculated as Kpt = (1 − δ)Kp,t−1 + Ipt, where Kp0 = K˜p0.
(4) The deflator for total fixed assets by province can be calculated using K˜pt and Kpt.
The following firms are removed as outliers from the database: 1) firms with a non-positive
value for Yit, Kit, Lit, or Mit; 2) firms whose Yit/Lit or Kit/Lit in t is more than 1000 times or less
than 0.001 the value in t − 1; or 3) firms in Tobacco (industrial codes 161, 162, and 169) and
nuclear-related industries (253 and 424). Table 1 shows the number of firms. Manufacturing
firm-level data without outliers are used for the estimation.
[– Table 1 –]
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the panel data by ownership sector. “State” denotes
state-owned firms, including state-owned enterprises and solely state-funded corporations. “Pri-
vate+” denotes domestic and non-state-owned firms, including collective-owned firms (and
other hybrids) and privately funded enterprises. “Foreign” denotes firms with funds from Hong
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan and those that are purely foreign-funded enterprises. The State sector
shows the smallest number of firms and a sharp decrease of 57% from 2003 to 2007, whereas
the number of private and foreign firms increased during the four years. The Private+ sector has
the largest number of firms, accounting for 76% of the total in 2007. However, its output per
firm is nearly five times smaller than that of state-owned firms in 2007, indicating that most pri-
vate firms operate as small entities compared with state and foreign firms. Note that the number
of firms in 2004 increases 1.4 times compared to the previous year. Because Chinese economic
census was conducted in 2004, the sample coverage has been probably expanded since 2004.
[– Table 2 –]
2)However, this IDs are often missing or changes over time. Hence, this paper creates a new series of firm IDs
by using firm attributes, such as original firm IDs, firm names, and phone numbers. Firm-matching is conducted
by R. The matching algorithm is described in Appendix B.
3)See their online appendix: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/n07057/china/.
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3.3 Estimates of Output Elasticities
The production function is separately estimated by industry using a three-digit industrial code.4)
Appendix Tables A1–A4 report the estimates of the average output elasticities for each input
and the sum of the elasticities for capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. The estimates of
GNR’s method are found to show lower average elasticities of intermediate inputs (ηM) than
the OLS estimates in every industry. The difference between the GNR and OLS estimates of
ηM is 0.32 on average, and the OLS estimates are approximately 1.55 times higher on average
than the GNR estimates. These results are clearly expected and consistent with the estimation
results in GNR (2016). The failure to control the endogenous bias from the correlation between
flexible variables and unobservable productivity (ωit) is known to lead to overestimates of the
coefficients on flexible variables because positive productivity shocks are likely to increase the
use of flexible inputs. The average elasticities of capital and labor as estimated by OLS are
lower than the estimates based on the GNR method, which is also consistent with the empirical
results in GNR (2016).
China’s intermediate input elasticities shown in Appendix Tables A1–A4 are similar to
Colombia’s and Chile’s as estimated by GNR (2016). The data used in GNR (2016) are based
on five three-digit manufacturing industries (Food Products, Textiles, Apparel, Wood Products,
Fabricated Metal Products), and their estimates of input elasticities for these industries are 0.54
for Colombia, and 0.55 for Chile, respectively. This paper’s average elasticity for the nearly
corresponding industries (131, 171, 181, 203, and 341) is 0.53, which is slightly smaller than
the estimates of Colombia and Chile.
4 Allocation Efficiency
This section presents the results of the augmented dynamic OP (ADOP) decomposition us-
ing China’s manufacturing firm-level productivity. These methods enable us to simultaneously
quantify allocation efficiency within and between three ownership groups ( j ∈ {State (S ), Pri-
vate+ (P), and Foreign (F) sectors} (J = 3)). Because the three-digit industrial classification is
relatively narrow, several industries have few or no firms in any of the three ownership sectors.
To focus on the industries in which the three ownership sectors coexist, this analysis is con-
ducted on the three-digit industrial sectors with more than 50 firms for each ownership sector.
As a result, 75 industrial sectors are used for the analysis.5) The ADOP decomposition equation
for sector i is written as
∆Φ(i) =
1
3
∑
j∈{S ,P,F}
[
∆µSj (i) + ∆cov
S
j (i) + ent j(i) + ext j(i)
]
+ ∆ ˜cov(i).
Note that i denotes a three-digit industrial sector and the ADOP decomposition applies sepa-
rately for each i = 1, 2, . . . , 75.
4)Industries 212, 214, 233, 402, and 423 are included in 211, 219, 232, 409, and 429, respectively. The estima-
tion is implemented using R version 3.3.1 (R Development Core Team, 2009).
5)This sample selection may cause us to select industrial sectors where the state-owned firms are likely to survive
in the market. It is necessary to keep in mind that there may exist the inequality of competitive conditions between
the state and non-state sectors in such sectors.
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4.1 Allocation Efficiency between Ownership Groups
[– Figure 1 –]
Figure 1 demonstrates the ADOP decomposition of the aggregate TFP growth from 2003 to
2007. The main driver of the aggregate TFP growth is ∆covSj (i), changes in the simple average
log TFP of surviving firms. The contribution of the within and between allocation efficiency
∆covSj (i) and ∆ ˜cov(i) varies across sectors, and the median of these contribution is much smaller
than those of ∆covSj (i). This indicates that resource reallocation does not contribute significantly
to increasing the aggregate productivity growth.
[– Figure 2 –]
Figure 2 presents the allocation efficiency between three ownership groups (∆ ˜cov(i)) during
2003–2007. This figure exhibits the plots of aggregate productivity changes ∆Φ(i) and the
changes in allocation efficiency between the three ownership groups, ∆ ˜cov(i). Although the
average of ∆ ˜cov(i) is almost zero, it varies among industries, ranging from −0.167 to 0.109.
In all, 42 industrial sectors are plotted in the positive area of the vertical axis (∆ ˜cov(i) > 0),
indicating that these industries tend to improve resource allocation among the three ownership
groups.
[– Figure 3 –]
To investigate the source of the variation in ∆ ˜cov(i), it is rewritten as follows:
∆ ˜cov(i) =
∑
j∈{S ,P,F}
[
x j2(i) y j2(i) − x j1(i) y j1(i)
]
=
∑
j∈{S ,P,F}
[
y j2(i) ∆x j2(i) + x j1(i) ∆y j2(i)
] (12)
where x jt(i) = w jt(i) − 1/J∑ j w jt(i) and y jt(i) = µ˜ jt(i) − 1/J∑ j µ˜ jt(i) for t = 1, 2. For industry i
and ownership sector j, ∆x jt(i) is changes in market share and ∆y jt(i) is changes in the centered
aggregate productivity during 2003–2007. The relationship among the three variables (∆ ˜cov,
∆x jt, and ∆y jt) is plotted in Panels (A)–(C) of Figure 3 by ownership, where the horizontal axis
is ∆x jt, and the vertical axis is ∆y jt. The red-colored plots denote industries with positive ∆ ˜cov
values in Figure 2, whereas the blue-colored plots denote industries with negative ∆ ˜cov values.6)
As shown in Panel (A), the State sector’s market shares decreased in most industrial sectors,
and red plots in Panel (A) are primarily distributed in the third quadrant. This result indicates
that resource allocation between ownership groups (∆ ˜cov) tends to improve in industries in
which the State sector’s market share and productivity both decrease. In contrast, the blue plots
6)Note that the first and third quadrants in Panels (A)–(C) indicate the positive relationship between the changes
in market share and productivity. However, this positive relationship does not necessarily produce positive ∆ ˜cov
values. As is clear from Equation (12), ∆ ˜cov does not necessarily become positive even if the sign of ∆x j2 is the
same direction as that of ∆y j2 for each j ∈ {S , P, F}.
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in Panel (A) are primarily distributed in the fourth quadrant, indicating that the resource allo-
cation between ownership groups are likely to worsen in industries in which the State sector’s
market share decreases but productivity increases.
Panel (B) shows the relationship between the changes in the Private+ sector’s market share
and productivity. Contrary to Panel (A), the red and blue plots are primarily distributed in
the first and second quadrants, respectively, indicating that the resource allocation between
ownership groups tends to improve in industries in which the Private+ sector’s market share
and productivity both increase and worsen in industries in which the Private+ sector’s market
share increases but productivity decreases. In contrast, the Foreign sector (Panel (C)) does not
show a clear relationship between red and blue plots.
In summary, the allocation efficiency between ownership sectors tends to improve in in-
dustries in which the market share moves from the less-productive State sector to the more-
productive Private+ sector. In contrast, the allocation efficiency tends to worsen in industries
in which 1) the State sector’s productivity relatively increases despite a decrease in its market
share or 2) the Private+ sector’s productivity does not grow compared with the other sectors
despite an increase in its market share.
4.2 Within-Effects for Each Ownership Group
[– Figure 4 –]
Figure 4 reports the histograms of the within-effects. The vertical axis defines the number
of three-digit industrial sectors (i = 1, 2, . . . , 75). Panels (A), (B) and (C) show allocation
efficiency ∆covSj (i), entry effects ent j(i), and exit effects ext j(i) within a group j ∈ {S , P, F},
respectively.7)
Panel (A) shows that the medians of these histograms is −0.006 (State), 0.02 (Private+),
and 0.009 (Foreign), and that the shares of the number of sectors with ∆covSj (i) > 0 are 46.1%,
64.5%, and 54.0%, respectively. Although the values of ∆covSj (i) are distributed broadly for
each group, the Private+ group tends to improve its allocation efficiency among firms during
2003–2007. The entry effect in Panel (B) shows that the medians for each group are −0.003
(State), −0.018 (Private+), and −0.011 (Foreign), and the shares of the number of sectors with
ent j(i) > 0 are 46.1%, 31.6%, and 40.8%, respectively. This result indicates that new entry
firms in all groups during 2003–2007 have, on average, lower productivity than existing firms
for each group.] Consequently, they have a negative effect on aggregate productivity growth.
In particular, new entry firms in the Private+ sector tend to show relatively low productivity
compared to the other sectors. Furthermore, the exit effect of the Private+ group shown in Panel
(C) is also small. The medians are 0.039 (State), 0.0061 (Private+), and 0.0095 (Foreign), and
the shares of the number of sectors with ext j(i) > 0 are 80.3%, 56.6%, and 64.5%, respectively,
implying that relatively nonproductive firms in the Private+ group are not likely to exit the
market.
7)Appendix Figures A1–A4 demonstrate the bar-plots of the decomposition into the ownership sectors by 3-digit
industry.
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In summary, the Private+ sector tends to have more industrial sectors improving allocation
efficiency among firms, compared with State and Foreign sectors. However, the entry and exit
effects for Private+ are very weak. In particular, the entry effect has negative values for many
industrial sectors, indicating that new firms in the Private+ sector tend to be less productive than
existing firms and drive down aggregate productivity growth.
5 Conclusions
Despite the fact many scholars have shown an interest in China’s allocation efficiency, few
studies have examined quantitative analysis of allocation efficiency within and between the
state-owned and private sectors. The author addresses this issue, using China’s manufacturing
firm-level data and a newmeasure of allocation efficiency that is an extension of the productivity
decomposition methods proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Melitz and Polanec (2015).
This new measure enables us to simultaneously capture the degree of misallocation within a
group and between groups, and parallel to capturing the contribution of entering and exiting
firms to aggregate TFP growth. Because the methods used by Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Melitz and Polanec (2015) cannot capture the degree of allocation efficiency between groups,
this new measure can be considered a group-wise extension of their methods.
It is found that misallocation between three ownership groups declined in 42 of the 75 three-
digit industrial sectors, indicating that these industries improved resource allocation among the
three ownership groups. Furthermore, misallocation tended to decline in industries wherein
market shares move from the less-productive State sector to the more-productive Private+ sec-
tor. In contrast, misallocation tended to worsen in industries in which 1) the State sector’s
productivity relatively increases despite decreases in its market share or 2) the Private+ sec-
tor’s productivity does not grow compared with that of the other sectors despite increases in its
market share.
These empirical results lead us to conclude that resource allocation between State, Private+,
and Foreign sectors tends to improve by allocating production resources to more productive
private firms from less productive state-owned firms. In other words, industries in which less
productive state-owned firms have greater market share are likely to be lower allocation effi-
ciency. What is behind the behavior of allocation efficiency in China? According to previous
studies, financial frictions are believed to be an important source of misallocation (Caggese and
Cun˜at, 2013; Midrigan and Xu, 2014). The main source of misallocation between ownership
sectors could be attributed to unequal access to factor resources, such as capital from bank loans,
subsidies, and land, between state-owned and non-state owned firms. A favorable environment
for the state sector or a phenomenon “Guojin Mintui” (i.e., the state advances, the private sector
retreats) may impede the growth of the private sector, causing resource allocation to deteriorate.
Although identifying the source of misallocation is challenging, reexamining the equity of com-
petitive conditions among firms in the financial market in terms of optimal resource allocation
is crucially important.
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Table 1: Number of firms
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
The original number of firms 1) 196,220 276,474 271,835 301,960 336,768
Manufacturing firms 2) 181,225 257,075 251,556 279,309 313,046
Manufacturing firms without outliers 3) 173,186 246,821 243,922 272,119 306,427
1) Number of sample firms of the original database, which includes firms in the mining, manu-
facturing, and public utilities industries.
2) Number of manufacturing firms of the original database.
3) Number of firms used for the estimation.
Table 2: Summary of Firm-level Panel Data1)
Average
Num Y K L M
All (2003) 173,186 71,374 23,197 275 54,829
All (2004) 246,821 65,016 19,068 225 49,679
All (2005) 243,922 78,505 21,838 239 59,292
All (2006) 272,119 86,894 22,779 228 65,253
All (2007) 306,427 96,697 23,316 220 72,432
State (2003) 14,458 115,053 69,480 597 88,769
State (2004) 13,407 108,548 59,460 461 83,433
State (2005) 9,758 170,049 85,542 597 130,147
State (2006) 8,319 211,790 104,574 623 162,019
State (2007) 6,122 335,632 145,929 792 261,067
Private+ (2003) 121,514 53,310 15,449 220 40,833
Private+ (2004) 178,917 48,180 13,422 180 36,808
Private+ (2005) 179,020 58,393 15,383 188 44,224
Private+ (2006) 204,527 64,353 15,713 178 48,399
Private+ (2007) 234,384 71,291 16,054 169 53,194
Foreign (2003) 37,214 113,387 30,514 330 87,346
Foreign (2004) 54,497 109,581 27,667 315 83,631
Foreign (2005) 55,144 127,596 31,521 341 95,673
Foreign (2006) 59,273 147,147 35,681 348 109,828
Foreign (2007) 65,921 164,841 37,749 348 123,313
1) Outliers are excluded. Y , K, L, and M denote the average values of
output, fixed capital, the number of labor, and intermediate inputs.
These variables are constant prices at 2003. Num is the number of
firms.
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Figure 2: Changes in allocation efficiency between ownership groups during 2004–2007
Notes: Red-colored plots denote industries with positive ∆ ˜cov values, whereas blue-colored plots
denote industries with negative ∆ ˜cov values.
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Figure 3: Source of the variation in ∆ ˜cov(i) during 2004–2007
Notes: This figure shows the plots of changes in productivity (horizontal axis) and changes in market
share (vertical axis) for (A) State, (B) Private+, and (C) Foreign sectors. Red-colored plots denote
industries with positive ∆ ˜cov values in Figure 2, whereas blue-colored plots denote industries with
negative ∆ ˜cov values.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of the within-effect by ownership during 2003–2007
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Appendix A: Production Function Estimation
Following GNR (2016), this section describes the framework of firm behavior and shows the
identification strategy of the production function.
A.1 Model of Firm Behavior
Let us consider that firm i operates through discrete time t and produces output Yit using capital
Kit, labor Lit, and intermediate inputs Mit. The relationship between these inputs and output is
assumed to be determined by a production function F and a Hicks neutral productivity shock
νit as follows:
Yit = F(Kit, Lit,Mit) exp{νit}
= F(Kit, Lit,Mit) exp{ωit + εit}, (A.1)
where the productivity shock νit is decomposed as νit = ωit + εit. It is assumed that ωit is an
anticipated productivity known to firm i, but unobservable to the econometrician,8) and εit repre-
sents an unanticipated productivity shock and/or measurement error that cannot be observed by
firm i before making period t’s decisions. Letting Iit denote the available information set of the
firm in period t, the anticipated productivity (ωit) is included in the information set (ωit ∈ Iit),
while εit is not included (εit < Iit). Furthermore, ωit is assumed to evolve over time according
to the first-order Markov process and is decomposed into its conditional expectation given all
information known to the firm in period t − 1 and a residual (ξit). Thus, ωit can be expressed as:
ωit = E(ωit | Ii,t−1) + ξit
= E(ωit | ωi,t−1) + ξit
= g(ωi,t−1) + ξit,
(A.2)
where ξit is, by definition, uncorrelated to g(ωi,t−1) because it is defined as new information not
available in period t − 1, which is frequently referred to as an innovation at t. The innovation ξit
and the ex post shock εit are assumed to be mean zero random variables.
The data generating process of capital, labor and intermediate inputs are assumed as follows:
The amounts of capital and labor inputs are the function of Ii,t−1, implying that these inputs are
predetermined in period t and, then, the information set in period t includes the amounts of
capital and labor in period t (i.e., Kit ∈ Iit and Lit ∈ Iit). This means that these inputs are quasi-
fixed inputs and that adjustment costs exist in capital and labor (e.g., hiring/firing, job training,
or machine installation costs). Intermediate input depends on the information in period t and
not to have dynamic implication. This implies that the choice of Mit is flexible in period t and is
not included in the information set available in period t (i.e., Mit < Iit). In other words, at each
period t, given the levels of labor, capital inputs, and ωit, firm i chooses the level of Mit.
8)The ωit represents a firm’s technology, information, knowledge, or situation that affects its productivity. For
example, business management differences, deviations from expected machine breakdown rates in a particular
period, or labor management problems.
21
A.2 Identification
A.2.1 Problem in the proxy approach
TFP is defined as exp{ωit + εit}. Taking the logarithm for both sides of Equation (A.1) yields:
yit = f (kit, lit,mit) + ωit + εit, (A.3)
log TFPit = ωit + εit,
where the lower-case letters denote the logs of their upper-case letters. Identifying f (kit, lit,mit)
is required to estimate TFP. However, since ωit is correlated with kit, lit, and mit under the data
generating process described the previous section, the regression of yit on inputs (kit, lit, and mit)
yields a biased estimate. To avoid this problem, LP (2003), ACF (2006), andWooldridge (2009)
employ a proxy approach as follows. Let us consider the demand function of intermediate
inputs:
mit = h(kit, lit, ωit). (A.4)
Assuming that the intermediate demand function is strictly monotonic in ωit, we obtain the
anticipated productivity expressed by the inverted intermediate demand function:
ωit = h−1(kit, lit,mit)
= φit − f (kit, lit,mit)
= g(φi,t−1 − f (ki,t−1, li,t−1,mi,t−1)) + ξit,
(A.5)
where φit = h−1(kit, lit,mit) + f (kit, lit,mit) ≡ φ(kit, lit,mit). The third equation of Equation (A.5)
is derived using Equation (A.2). The key idea of the proxy approach is to replace ωit with the
inverted demand function. Substituting Equation (A.5) into Equation (A.3), we obtain
yit = φ(kit, lit,mit) + εit
= f (kit, lit,mit) + g(φi,t−1 − f (ki,t−1, li,t−1,mi,t−1)) + ξit + εit. (A.6)
Because kit, ki,t−1, lit, li,t−1, and mi,t−1 are, by definition, uncorrelated with both ξit and εit, this
orthogonality is exploited to identify the production function. The estimation procedure of the
proxy approach has two steps: the first is to estimate φit and εit using the first equation of
Equation (A.6), and the second is to identify the parameters of the production function using
the results of the first step.
However, GNR (2016) shows that this proxy approach is not able to identify the production
function under the above assumption of data generating process.9) The cause of it lies in the
collinearity between inputs. Replacing ωit in Equation (A.4) with the inverted demand function,
we obtain
mit = h(kit, lit, g(h(ki,t−1, li,t−1,mi,t−1)) + ξit). (A.7)
9)Although the original proxy strategy proposed by OP (1996) exploits investment variable, GNR (2016) shows
that this strategy also raises similar identification problems.
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Given the predetermined variables (kit, ki,t−1, lit, li,t−1, and mi,t−1), no source of variation exists in
mit except for the unobservable ξit, implying that the production function is non-parametrically
under-identified.10) GNR (2016) proposed an alternative approach to solving the identification
problem based on gross output production functions, including both quasi-fixed inputs and flex-
ible inputs. This paper employs their identification strategy.
A.2.2 Identification strategy
GNR (2016) found that the source of the under-identification lies in the elasticity of flexible
inputs, that is, ∂ f (kit, lit,mit)/∂mit in this paper. The integration of the elasticity in terms of mit
can be expressed as ∫
∂ f (kit, lit,mit)
∂mit
dmit = f (kit, lit,mit) + ϕ(kit, lit) (A.8)
where ϕ(kit, lit) is a function of kit and lit, which denotes an integral constant in terms of mit.
Using Equation (A.8), yit can be rewritten as
yit =
∫
∂ f (kit, lit,mit)
∂mit
dmit − ϕ(kit, lit) + ωit + εit. (A.9)
If the integral of the flexible inputs elasticity is known, the proxy approach is able to identify
the production function (GNR, 2016, Theorem 3). Based on this theorem, GNR proposed
the following two-step identification strategy: (1) recovering the integral of the flexible inputs
elasticity by using the firm’s first-order condition; and (2) identifying the remaining function
ϕ(kit, lit). Given these estimates, TFP can be identified.
A specific estimation procedure employed in this paper is as follows. Let us consider the
firm’s expected profit maximization problem with respect to Mit under the perfect competition
in the intermediate input and output markets. The first-order condition of the problem is
Pt
∂F(Kit, Lit,Mit)
∂Mit
exp{ωit}E = ρt, (A.10)
where E ≡ E(exp{εit}), and Pt and ρt denote the output and intermediate input prices, respec-
tively. Multiplying both sides of Equation (A.10) by Mit/PtYit yields the revenue share of the
intermediate input:
S it ≡ ρtMitPtYit =
∂ f (kit, lit,mit)
∂mit
E
exp{εit}
= B(kit, lit,mit) exp{−εit},
(A.11)
where B(kit, lit,mit) ≡ [∂ f (kit, lit,mit)/∂mit]E. Taking the logarithm of both sides of Equation
(A.11) enables the share equation to be rewritten as:
sit = log{B(kit, lit,mit)} − εit, (A.12)
10)For more details, refer to Theorems 1 and 2 in GNR (2016).
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where sit ≡ log S it. The ex post shock εit is, by definition, orthogonal to kit, lit, and mit, so that
log{B(kit, lit,mit)} in Equation (A.12) can be non-parametrically identified using this orthogonal
conditions. In practice, following GNR (2016), B(kit, lit,mit) is approximated by a polynomial
series of degree 2:
B(kit, lit,mit) = β0 + βkkit + βllit + βmmit + βkkk2it + βlll2it + βmmm2it
+ βklkitlit + βkmkitmit + βlmlitmit.
(A.13)
Based on Equations (A.12) and (A.13), unknown parameters in Equation (A.13) and E are
estimated by non-linear regression methods. Because the integral of the intermediate inputs
elasticity is rewritten as∫
∂ f (kit, lit,mit)
∂mit
dmit =
∫
exp{log{B(kit, lit,mit)}}
E dmit
=
(
β0 + βkkit + βllit +
βm
2
mit + βkkk2it + βlll
2
it +
βmm
3
m2it
+βklkitlit +
βkm
2
kitmit +
βlm
2
litmit
) mit
E ,
(A.14)
this is recovered by replacing unknown parameters in Equation (A.14) with those non-linear
regression estimates.11)
The second step identifies the remaining ϕ(kit, lit). Following GNR (2016), ϕ(ki,t, li,t) is
approximated by a polynomial series of degree 2 as follows:
ϕ(ki,t, li,t) = αkkit + αllit + αkkk2it + αlll
2
it + αklkitlit
= zitα,
(A.15)
where zit = (kit, lit, k2it, l
2
it, kitlit) and α = (αk, αl, αkk, αll, αkl)
′. Let us define
y˜it ≡ yit −
∫
∂ f (kit, lit,mit)
∂mit
dmit − εit.
where y˜it is recovered using the estimates obtained in the first step. Then, given the observations,
ωit can be rewritten as a function of the unknown parameters α as follows:
ωit(α) = y˜it + zitα
= g(y˜i,t−1 + zi,t−1α) + ξit
= g(ωi,t−1(α)) + ξit
(A.16)
Furthermore, the function g(·) is approximated by a third-order polynomial in ωi,t−1(α) such as
ωit(α) = δ0 + δ1 ωi,t−1(α) + δ2 [ωi,t−1(α)]2 + δ3 [ωi,t−1(α)]3 + ξit
= wi,t−1δ + ξit
(A.17)
where
wi,t−1 = [1, ωi,t−1(α), [ωi,t−1(α)]2, [ωi,t−1(α)]3]
δ = [δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3]′.
11)The E ≡ E(exp{εit}) is recovered using the residual of the non-parametric regression (εˆit).
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The orthogonal conditions E(w′i,t−1ξit) = 0 and E(z
′
i,t−1ξit) = 0 can be used to estimate δ and α,
respectively. The specific steps are as follows: First, given the initial value of α, ξit is estimated
as the residual of Equations (A.17); and the estimate of α can then be obtained by minimizing
the value of a function f (α) = sˆ′zξ sˆzξ with respect to α, where szξ denotes the sample analogue
of the moment condition E(z′i,t−1ξit):
12)
sˆzξ =
1
N
∑
i∈N
1
Ti
∑
t∈Ti
z′it ξˆit(α). (A.18)
The estimate of α is used to recover ϕ(ki,t, li,t).
Having obtained the estimates of the integral of intermediate inputs elasticity (Equation
(A.14)) and ϕ(ki,t, li,t) in this identification strategy, TFP can be recovered.
12)The Nelder-Mead method is used for the minimization of f (α).
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Appendix B: Firm-matching Algorithm
Step 0: Create new ID for each database.
Step 1: Matching between year t and year t + 1 (t = 2002, 2003, ..., 2007)
0) t = 2002
1) Firm ID matching
If matched, the ID of Year t + 1’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID. Save
matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
2) Firm name matching using not matching samples and duplicated samples in 1).
If matched, the ID of Year t + 1’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID.
Save matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
3) Firm ID & Firm name & Firm Tel matching using not matching samples and dupli-
cated samples in 2).
If matched, the ID of Year t + 1’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID.
Save matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
* Duplicated samples in 3) are considered as ”Duplicated.”
4) t = t + 1 and return to 1)
Step 2: Matching between year t and year t + 2 (t = 2002, 2003, ..., 2006) using samples not
matched in step 1
0) t = 2002
1) Firm ID matching
If matched, the ID of Year t + 2’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID.
Save matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
2) Firm name matching using not matching samples and duplicated samples in 1).
If matched, the ID of Year t + 2’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID.
Save matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
3) Firm ID & Firm name & Firm Tel matching using not matching samples and dupli-
cated samples in 2).
If matched, the ID of Year t + 2’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID.
Save matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
* Duplicated samples in 3) are considered as ”Duplicated.”
4) t = t + 1 and return to 1)
...
Step 5: Matching between year t and year t + 5 (t = 2002) using samples not matched in the
previous steps
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0) t = 2002
1) Firm ID matching
If matched, the ID of Year t + 5’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID.
Save matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
2) Firm name matching using not matching samples and duplicated samples in 1).
If matched, the ID of Year t + 5’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID.
Save matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
3) Firm ID & Firm name & Firm Tel matching using not matching samples and dupli-
cated samples in 2).
If matched, the ID of Year t + 5’s sample is overwritten with the year t’s ID.
Save matching samples, not matching samples, and duplicated samples.
* Duplicated samples in 3) are considered as ”Duplicated.”
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Table A1: Average Input Elasticities of Output (1)
GNR OLS
Industry K L M K + L + M K L M K + L + M
131 0.0713 0.2291 0.5269 0.8272 0.0116 0.0521 0.9264 0.9902
132 0.1447 0.3462 0.4550 0.9459 0.0144 0.0637 0.9306 1.0086
133 0.1731 0.2582 0.3757 0.8070 0.0147 0.0351 0.9257 0.9755
134 0.1242 0.1891 0.6689 0.9822 0.0271 0.0134 0.9520 0.9924
135 0.0958 0.3431 0.3628 0.8017 0.0085 0.0344 0.9454 0.9883
136 0.0873 0.1354 0.7161 0.9387 0.0206 0.0519 0.9315 1.0039
137 0.0824 0.1220 0.6367 0.8411 0.0204 0.0327 0.9095 0.9626
139 0.0741 0.1997 0.6210 0.8949 0.0145 0.0451 0.9238 0.9833
141 0.1269 0.2421 0.5738 0.9428 0.0266 0.0785 0.9102 1.0152
142 0.0652 0.1599 0.7000 0.9251 0.0156 0.0620 0.9268 1.0044
143 0.1230 0.2413 0.4973 0.8617 0.0250 0.0396 0.9172 0.9819
144 0.0873 0.1364 0.6949 0.9186 0.0088 0.0405 0.9437 0.9930
145 0.0674 0.1289 0.7024 0.8987 0.0200 0.0417 0.9241 0.9859
146 0.1538 0.1610 0.6199 0.9348 0.0173 0.0240 0.9449 0.9862
149 0.0996 0.2918 0.4991 0.8905 0.0131 0.0616 0.9112 0.9860
151 0.0947 0.2222 0.6861 1.0030 -0.0148 0.0757 0.9499 1.0109
152 0.1746 0.2693 0.4300 0.8740 0.0193 0.0541 0.9328 1.0061
153 0.1761 0.2787 0.5399 0.9946 0.0284 0.0469 0.9313 1.0065
154 0.0868 0.1410 0.6910 0.9188 0.0267 0.0627 0.9187 1.0080
171 0.1013 0.1913 0.5255 0.8181 0.0078 0.0511 0.9263 0.9852
172 0.0758 0.1160 0.6794 0.8712 0.0101 0.0369 0.9413 0.9882
173 0.1135 0.1508 0.6541 0.9183 0.0091 0.0288 0.9236 0.9615
174 0.0422 0.1223 0.7484 0.9129 0.0105 0.0470 0.9252 0.9827
175 0.1019 0.1895 0.4931 0.7846 0.0178 0.0514 0.9185 0.9877
176 0.0761 0.1309 0.6625 0.8695 0.0185 0.0817 0.8819 0.9821
181 0.1207 0.2753 0.4319 0.8280 0.0230 0.0967 0.8633 0.9830
182 0.0463 0.1903 0.6773 0.9139 0.0243 0.0840 0.8921 1.0004
183 0.0603 0.1380 0.6918 0.8902 0.0187 0.0706 0.8689 0.9583
191 0.0594 0.1637 0.6986 0.9217 0.0269 0.0603 0.8946 0.9818
192 0.0979 0.1505 0.6828 0.9312 0.0204 0.0906 0.8794 0.9904
193 0.0841 0.1285 0.6804 0.8930 0.0225 0.0457 0.9418 1.0100
194 0.1031 0.0866 0.5700 0.7597 0.0128 0.0238 0.9162 0.9529
201 0.1224 0.3116 0.3281 0.7621 0.0187 0.0651 0.8892 0.9731
202 0.0866 0.1216 0.6866 0.8948 0.0282 0.0266 0.9103 0.9652
203 0.1052 0.1534 0.5923 0.8509 0.0276 0.0679 0.8624 0.9579
204 0.0643 0.1736 0.7049 0.9428 0.0433 0.0732 0.8417 0.9582
211 0.0843 0.2388 0.5073 0.8304 0.0221 0.0620 0.9028 0.9869
213 0.0597 0.1637 0.7345 0.9579 0.0245 0.0523 0.9276 1.0044
219 0.0524 0.1839 0.7248 0.9610 0.0197 0.0690 0.8809 0.9696
221 0.1033 0.0980 0.7049 0.9063 0.0265 -0.0085 0.9478 0.9659
222 0.1531 0.2530 0.3982 0.8044 0.0030 0.0423 0.9396 0.9848
223 0.1463 0.2631 0.4144 0.8237 0.0223 0.0488 0.9152 0.9863
231 0.1404 0.2099 0.6164 0.9667 0.0557 0.0542 0.9014 1.0114
232 0.0910 0.2123 0.6437 0.9470 0.0243 0.0945 0.9186 1.0374
241 0.0659 0.1727 0.7082 0.9469 0.0333 0.0612 0.8996 0.9940
242 0.0541 0.1558 0.6719 0.8818 0.0248 0.0688 0.8920 0.9856
243 0.1003 0.1422 0.6887 0.9312 0.0211 0.0998 0.8818 1.0028
244 0.0545 0.1659 0.6747 0.8950 0.0250 0.0842 0.8701 0.9793
245 0.0543 0.0723 0.7595 0.8861 0.0334 0.0421 0.9189 0.9944
251 0.1909 0.1681 0.6342 0.9932 0.0174 0.0450 0.9198 0.9822
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Table A2: Average Input Elasticities of Output (2)
GNR OLS
Industry K L M K + L + M K L M K + L + M
251 0.1909 0.1681 0.6342 0.9932 0.0174 0.0450 0.9198 0.9822
252 0.1186 0.1465 0.6801 0.9452 0.0082 0.0600 0.8996 0.9678
261 0.1331 0.1504 0.6210 0.9045 0.0243 0.0345 0.9190 0.9778
262 0.1116 0.1309 0.6441 0.8866 0.0308 0.0373 0.9135 0.9815
263 0.0863 0.2334 0.5280 0.8477 0.0173 0.0451 0.9267 0.9891
264 0.0431 0.1702 0.6793 0.8926 0.0262 0.0367 0.9215 0.9844
265 0.2809 0.2972 0.1959 0.7740 0.0208 0.0435 0.9007 0.9650
266 0.1471 0.1175 0.5334 0.7980 0.0250 0.0462 0.9038 0.9750
267 0.1166 0.2041 0.4983 0.8190 0.0257 0.0353 0.9241 0.9851
271 0.1536 0.2261 0.5097 0.8894 0.0276 0.0462 0.9168 0.9906
272 0.1253 0.3686 0.4442 0.9381 0.0273 0.0898 0.8777 0.9948
273 0.0724 0.1521 0.5783 0.8028 0.0369 0.0671 0.8760 0.9799
274 0.1097 0.2899 0.4698 0.8694 0.0296 0.0656 0.9020 0.9972
275 0.1650 0.1677 0.6571 0.9898 0.0340 0.0752 0.9313 1.0404
276 0.1060 0.2100 0.5836 0.8996 0.0397 0.0942 0.8593 0.9933
277 0.1349 0.1837 0.4762 0.7948 0.0386 0.0421 0.9051 0.9858
281 0.1143 0.0541 0.7336 0.9021 0.0268 0.0113 0.9400 0.9781
282 0.0862 0.0924 0.7673 0.9458 0.0149 0.0311 0.9400 0.9859
291 0.0477 0.2733 0.6323 0.9533 -0.0053 0.0238 0.9538 0.9723
292 0.2399 0.0490 0.5302 0.8191 0.0355 0.0302 0.9128 0.9785
293 0.1430 0.0916 0.5877 0.8223 0.0382 0.0538 0.8721 0.9642
294 0.0835 0.1736 0.6627 0.9198 0.0177 0.0435 0.9182 0.9794
295 0.0853 0.1256 0.7049 0.9158 0.0223 0.1014 0.8797 1.0035
296 0.0807 0.2144 0.5812 0.8764 0.0003 0.0795 0.8879 0.9677
299 0.1112 0.1191 0.6060 0.8363 0.0452 0.0556 0.8668 0.9676
301 0.1392 0.0966 0.6381 0.8739 0.0258 0.0302 0.9299 0.9860
302 0.1306 0.1751 0.4660 0.7717 0.0154 0.0361 0.9224 0.9739
303 0.0567 0.1904 0.5556 0.8027 0.0261 0.0475 0.9048 0.9783
304 0.1012 0.2373 0.4083 0.7469 0.0181 0.0528 0.8906 0.9615
305 0.0594 0.1712 0.7436 0.9743 0.0004 -0.0089 0.9854 0.9769
306 0.1083 0.1366 0.6872 0.9321 0.0341 0.0463 0.8872 0.9676
307 0.0902 0.1657 0.6927 0.9486 0.0521 0.0766 0.8538 0.9825
308 0.0748 0.1431 0.6787 0.8966 0.0303 0.0765 0.8770 0.9839
309 0.0728 0.1179 0.6762 0.8669 0.0331 0.0593 0.8656 0.9580
311 0.1617 0.1194 0.5480 0.8291 0.0154 0.0246 0.9358 0.9758
312 0.1525 0.1476 0.5891 0.8891 0.0403 0.0148 0.9301 0.9851
313 0.1474 0.1329 0.5431 0.8233 0.0269 0.0286 0.9266 0.9821
314 0.1399 0.2175 0.4955 0.8530 0.0392 0.0454 0.8985 0.9831
315 0.0734 0.1107 0.6572 0.8414 0.0141 0.0509 0.9086 0.9735
316 0.0954 0.0666 0.6920 0.8539 0.0323 0.0102 0.9568 0.9992
319 0.1492 0.1396 0.4936 0.7824 0.0371 0.0167 0.9237 0.9775
321 0.1108 0.1531 0.6663 0.9302 0.0080 0.0426 0.9374 0.9879
322 0.0876 0.1412 0.7481 0.9769 0.0093 0.0447 0.9430 0.9970
323 0.2436 0.3123 0.3682 0.9241 0.0091 0.0591 0.9152 0.9834
324 0.0594 0.1838 0.6701 0.9133 0.0178 0.0425 0.9238 0.9842
331 0.1173 0.1989 0.5304 0.8466 0.0141 0.0600 0.9041 0.9782
332 0.1524 0.0395 0.6522 0.8440 0.0315 0.0707 0.8752 0.9774
333 0.0582 0.1050 0.7056 0.8687 0.0139 0.0367 0.9191 0.9697
334 0.0690 0.0807 0.7420 0.8916 0.0231 0.0393 0.9185 0.9809
335 0.1308 0.1361 0.6582 0.9251 0.0192 0.0492 0.9000 0.9684
341 0.0995 0.1794 0.5815 0.8604 0.0216 0.0694 0.8824 0.9735
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Table A3: Average Input Elasticities of Output (3)
GNR OLS
Industry K L M K + L + M K L M K + L + M
342 0.0852 0.1415 0.7040 0.9307 0.0302 0.0620 0.8909 0.9831
343 0.2250 0.2428 0.3852 0.8530 0.0277 0.0565 0.8853 0.9695
344 0.0579 0.4971 0.2150 0.7701 0.0060 0.0798 0.8762 0.9620
345 0.1370 0.2704 0.3894 0.7968 0.0231 0.0643 0.9062 0.9936
346 0.0929 0.1595 0.6347 0.8871 0.0422 0.0631 0.8518 0.9571
347 0.0623 0.1111 0.6963 0.8697 0.0129 0.0624 0.8937 0.9690
348 0.0959 0.1458 0.6256 0.8674 0.0190 0.0718 0.8785 0.9693
349 0.1232 0.1271 0.6210 0.8714 0.0293 0.0613 0.8751 0.9657
351 0.1011 0.1938 0.5664 0.8613 0.0124 0.0384 0.9108 0.9616
352 0.0765 0.1400 0.6389 0.8554 0.0221 0.0480 0.9154 0.9855
353 0.2140 0.1579 0.4363 0.8083 0.0207 0.0427 0.9063 0.9697
354 0.1398 0.2379 0.4828 0.8606 0.0246 0.0389 0.9118 0.9753
355 0.1423 0.0913 0.6369 0.8705 0.0352 0.0336 0.8937 0.9625
356 0.0709 0.1374 0.7103 0.9185 0.0203 0.0247 0.9191 0.9640
357 0.2344 0.3401 0.2104 0.7849 0.0281 0.0342 0.9067 0.9691
358 0.1402 0.1524 0.5194 0.8120 0.0397 0.0610 0.8885 0.9892
359 0.1156 0.1295 0.6307 0.8758 0.0225 0.0247 0.9260 0.9732
361 0.1080 0.0960 0.6019 0.8058 0.0261 0.0125 0.9190 0.9576
362 0.1109 0.1672 0.6252 0.9034 0.0472 0.0486 0.8636 0.9594
363 0.1212 0.1772 0.5462 0.8446 0.0247 0.0153 0.9658 1.0059
364 0.0854 0.1049 0.6899 0.8803 0.0260 0.0205 0.9246 0.9711
365 0.0395 0.1391 0.7019 0.8805 0.0105 0.0464 0.9055 0.9624
366 0.1698 0.3423 0.2646 0.7766 0.0375 0.0370 0.8632 0.9377
367 0.1163 0.2282 0.4994 0.8438 0.0183 0.0369 0.9435 0.9987
368 0.1763 0.2918 0.4467 0.9148 0.0449 0.0564 0.8705 0.9719
369 0.0924 0.1566 0.5862 0.8352 0.0313 0.0375 0.9003 0.9691
371 0.1375 0.1331 0.6066 0.8772 0.0231 0.0443 0.9062 0.9735
372 0.1902 0.3083 0.4306 0.9290 0.0313 0.0559 0.9063 0.9935
373 0.0595 0.1647 0.7458 0.9701 0.0167 0.0412 0.9231 0.9810
374 0.0763 0.2542 0.5672 0.8977 0.0169 0.0804 0.8851 0.9824
375 0.1113 0.2521 0.4982 0.8616 0.0122 0.1074 0.8586 0.9782
376 0.1674 0.1575 0.6040 0.9289 0.1050 0.0930 0.7712 0.9692
379 0.0173 0.1612 0.6226 0.8011 0.0167 0.0545 0.8809 0.9521
391 0.2044 0.2800 0.3466 0.8310 0.0115 0.0649 0.8978 0.9742
392 0.1784 0.3210 0.2521 0.7515 0.0230 0.0627 0.8825 0.9681
393 0.1827 0.1517 0.5009 0.8353 0.0289 0.0519 0.8987 0.9795
394 0.1091 0.1988 0.6339 0.9418 0.0278 0.0648 0.8763 0.9690
395 0.0705 0.1234 0.7288 0.9227 0.0172 0.0609 0.9119 0.9900
396 0.0650 0.1053 0.7326 0.9030 0.0188 0.0319 0.9326 0.9832
397 0.0698 0.2334 0.6168 0.9199 0.0228 0.0717 0.8887 0.9833
399 0.1239 0.3411 0.5066 0.9716 0.0262 0.0986 0.8638 0.9886
401 0.1810 0.2354 0.4320 0.8485 0.0254 0.0935 0.8213 0.9402
403 0.0941 0.1579 0.6366 0.8886 0.0157 0.0589 0.8787 0.9534
404 0.0968 0.3854 0.3308 0.8130 0.0342 0.0930 0.8193 0.9466
405 0.2839 0.3758 0.2264 0.8860 0.0571 0.0811 0.8264 0.9646
406 0.1123 0.1628 0.6387 0.9138 0.0413 0.0840 0.8570 0.9823
407 0.0741 0.2838 0.5475 0.9054 0.0236 0.0977 0.8656 0.9870
409 0.1429 0.1825 0.3999 0.7254 0.0393 0.0727 0.8343 0.9463
411 0.2216 0.1265 0.3740 0.7220 0.0333 0.0475 0.8850 0.9658
412 0.1472 0.3393 0.4212 0.9077 0.0171 0.0554 0.9132 0.9857
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Table A4: Average Input Elasticities of Output (4)
GNR OLS
Industry K L M K + L + M K L M K + L + M
413 0.0304 0.1740 0.6639 0.8683 0.0094 0.1140 0.8516 0.9750
414 0.0456 0.1954 0.6435 0.8845 0.0321 0.0872 0.8457 0.9649
415 0.0617 0.2516 0.5839 0.8972 0.0244 0.0824 0.8442 0.9509
419 0.1835 0.1313 0.4567 0.7715 0.0604 0.0395 0.8303 0.9302
421 0.0762 0.1501 0.6127 0.8389 0.0294 0.0798 0.8689 0.9781
422 0.0662 0.1218 0.7304 0.9184 0.0296 0.0477 0.9014 0.9787
429 0.1309 0.1567 0.5947 0.8823 0.0476 0.0534 0.8770 0.9780
431 0.0660 0.0753 0.6954 0.8367 0.0299 0.0327 0.8998 0.9624
432 0.0925 0.0851 0.6833 0.8609 0.0350 0.0602 0.8588 0.9540
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